

Is lobbying really effective? A field experiment of local interest group tactics to influence elected representatives in the UK¹

Liz Richardson and Peter John

Institute for Political and Economic Governance, School of Social
Sciences, University of Manchester
www.ipeg.org.uk

contact: liz.richardson@manchester.ac.uk

**Paper prepared for presentation to Workshop 5:
*'Professionalization and Individualized Collective Action:
Analyzing New 'Participatory' Dimensions in Civil Society'*
European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Lisbon
14-19 April, 2009**

¹. We thank our funders, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Department of Communities and Local Government (CLG) and NWIEP who supported the project, *Rediscovering the Civic: Achieving Better Outcomes in Public Policy*. We thank Frank Baumgartner and Don Green for their comments at the design phase as well as our research colleagues, Sarah Cotterill, Margaret Holmes, Hisako Normura, Graham Smith, Gerry Stoker and Corrine Wales.

Abstract

This paper argues that studies of lobbying have tended to neglect the measurement of the influence of interest groups. This major gap in the field comes from the difficulty of making an inference because lobbyists select their target and strategies based on the likelihood of success. In these circumstances observational studies are not able to show that the effort of lobbyists causes an outcome. When done correctly, experimental studies can make such an inference. This paper presents the design and pilot findings from such a cluster randomised controlled trial of lobbying of local councillors in England and Wales, where the councillors randomly receive different letters from interest groups recruited into the study.

Introduction – the problem of influence and lobbying

With a tradition and line of thinking reaching back to Madison, scholars have long speculated on the influence of interest groups, and whether particular kinds of tactics are likely to win over policy-makers. What interest groups do matters for democracy, whether it is helping get into the pluralist heaven of representing the public interest through competing for policy-makers' attention or the establishing the elitist hell of limited public debate and skewing outcomes under by well-organised groups. In fact, the community power debate of the 1960s and 1970s represented the high point of attempts to uncover the influence of interests groups on the policy process, with the two camps clearly demarcated. Famously, this debate fell apart and imploded over competing accounts of power and influence. Even the pluralists recognised that it was not possible to know whether the participation of an interest group in the policy-making process was the consequence of its resources and skill or the willingness of the policy-maker to listen to that particular group (cf. Lukes, 1974²). In more modern language, these academics hit the problem of selection: it is not possible to know the strength and direction of the causal arrow because the values on the independent variable are more usually observed only when the government is willing to listen to and respond to the interest group. The use of resources and tactics then become the consequences of the preferences of the power holder rather than the other way round.

As Mahoney (2007) observes, interest group scholars have often avoided studying influence. This is probably due to the sheer difficulty of making an inference because of the selection problem alluded to above. Added to that is

² Book re-issued 2005

difficulty of relying on self-reports, both of studies of advocates and of the policy-makers themselves, making it difficult to generate valid results as self-ascribed influence may be over-estimated, both by the interest group and by the policy-maker. For example, Baumgartner and Leech (1998) use a self-report measure of the effectiveness of different tactics, but they note that this “pose[s] serious reliability risks.” (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998: 156) This highlights the problem of generating effective measures both of influence and of policy outcomes related to the influence of the group. The main exception to this has been the literature on PAC contributions.

We think this neglect creates a major gap in the literature and it fails to answer the key question about interest groups, making other questions, such as organisation, size, membership, policy style, opposition, over-studied by comparison. Our remedy is to offer the experimental method as a potential way to address the question of influence as we can randomise the tactics lobbyists use. We in effect hold constant the type of interest group and lobbyists’ decisions whether to lobby or not so that any response we can measure depends on the difference in the treatments we apply. In this way, we seek to build on other field experiments as applied to citizen acts of participation (e.g. Green and Gerber, 2008). The difference with these citizen-based studies is that we randomise the strategy the interest groups use, which raise a series of operational and ethical issues, but nonetheless create what in our view is a pioneering study of interest groups, which can uncover whether resources devoted to a more professional lobby are effective or not.

In this paper, we review extant studies of the influence of lobbying and of the likely instruments lobbyists are likely to use, and detail our methods, discuss

the results so far from a pilot study, and then draw out the implications for the study of interest groups.

Studies of lobbying

In earlier account of interest group it might have been possible to say that whether a group was an insider or outsider was a way to ascertain its influence. But this debate, though useful in thinking about interest groups, is not a helpful starting point, largely because most groups are assumed to aspire to insider status, with insider strategy and tactics the means to getting to get access (Grant, 2000) and because in the politics of the ‘Third Way’, it is hard to find a group that has not been ushered into decision making structures (Grant, 2004). As a result we concentrate on the strategies and tactics lobbyists use.

There are differences in strategy according to whether groups wish to change the status quo, the choice to expand conflict or ‘go negative’, and whether to be visible or not (Baumgartner et al., 2009: pp. 192-194³), which affect our research because the lobbying letters are asking for something to change. However, we do not regard the typical groups we study at the level as being highly strong on that dimension as they do not want to change the system. Instead, there are a range of tactics interest groups use their resources to lever influence and achieve their ends. There are different preferences between the USA and Europe in their tactic of choice. For example, the US groups rely more on campaign contributions (Watson and Shackleton, 2003). There is a large and lively debate about the relative importance of cash contributions versus all other lobbying tactics, given that if contributions are an effective tactic then this produces and

³ NB forthcoming all page numbers for Baumgartner et al 2009 are for draft version

reflects inequalities between lobbyists. However access to large sums of cash may not be the key to success, with some writers arguing that “one of the best single predictors of success in the lobbying game is not how much money an organization has on its side, but simply whether it is attempting to protect the policy that is already in place.” (Baumgartner et al., 2009: p. 12). This line of argument is supported by other research e.g. by Lohmann (1995), which found that interest groups with preferences in line with the decision-maker’s got free access, while other lobby groups had to pay contributions. Regardless of the importance of cash contributions, we decided in our work not to consider this as a tactic partly because it would be feasible and/or sustainable for the small typically unfunded groups we were studying, but also partly because of the ethical and perception problems of bribery or corruption which run counter to the aim of the overall research programme to enhance the civic sphere and healthy democracy.

Aside from cash donations, other tactics include direct and informal contact, involvement in policy formulation, presentation of research findings, litigation, protests, constituent influence (e.g. letter writing campaigns), testimony at hearings, and the strategic use of information to influence policy choice. Leaving cash donations out of the list of tactics, then Milbraith (1963) and Berry (1977) (quoted in Baumgartner and Leech, 1998: p. 156) rate the effectiveness of different tactics, with direct or personal contact rated top, and letter writing and presentation of research results rated next.

In spite of the importance of informal contact between interest groups, we focus in our study on letter writing campaigns. Some of this was that letter writing would go with the grain of what citizen interest groups were already doing; interest groups already spend time making formal representations to

policy-makers, such as writing letters. The tactic may work as an entrée to direct face-to-face contact. Some of the reason for this was around resources – financial, capacity and time, and skills. There are significant differences between the resources and capacity of different types of groups to undertake their lobbying efforts: Some can afford lobbying efforts costing millions of dollars for a single lobbying campaign. Others operate on a shoestring, if they operate at all.” (Hall and Deardorff, 2006: p. 80). Clearly groups with more resources are at an advantage in conducting campaigns in all sorts of ways, compared to small citizen interest groups typically with very few resources, including some of the overstretched groups in our study, one which did not have email access. In the UK, voluntary organisations with annual incomes under £10,000 made up 56 per cent of all registered charities in 2006, and it was estimated that of the 600,000 organisations in the not-for-profit sector in 2002 (including registered charities and others), up to 360,000 were community-level organisations with small amounts of income, not registered as a charity (Richardson, 2008). Letter writing is a simple and low cost tactic that any group can use. It does not require the group to have significant time to devote to seeing up to 70 different politicians, or have the capacity to undertake its own research, finance litigation, or organise protests.

The relationship between effective lobbying tactics and what lobbying organisations actually do is a complicated one. Hall and Deardorff (2006) argue that even professional lobbyists “behavioural patterns often appear anomalous when viewed in the light of existing theories” (p. 69). This suggests that the ability even of the most professional lobbyists to act effectively is severely limited. Mahoney (2007) did not find a strong relationship between the frequency with

which an organisation uses a particular technique and the perceived effectiveness of that technique. In nearly all cases organisations rated the effectiveness of the method higher than their use of the method. Two of the lobbying methods, membership on advisory boards and participation in regulatory negotiations, were considered quite effective but used very infrequently. Her explanation is that the more effective tactics tend to be more costly and time consuming or hard to access and the least effective are easier to do and access. Taking these constraints on action in account also led us to focus on letter writing as one area where a lobbyist would be able to vary aspects relatively easily (e.g. compared to somehow obtaining membership of advisory boards) in the course of a campaign.

More importantly it is possible to alter the level of professionalism or potential effectiveness of a letter in a way that is much harder to do with small unincorporated community groups which lack experience of lobbying, and whose members have varying abilities to articulate their case, build relationships, understand the decision making system and constraints facing decision makers (although these limitations may become apparent in time as the lobby progresses). This could be crucial in levelling the playing field when citizen interest groups are pitted against professional lobbyists who are “among the most experienced, astute, and strategic actors one can find in the everyday practice of [American] policymaking.” (Hall and Deardorff, 2006: p. 70).

Going back to the central problem of endogeneity, we wanted to test whether effectiveness of an interest group was the consequence of the quality of its lobbying messages, or the predilections of the policy-maker for certain groups. Therefore, a core idea was to see if we could professionalise the tactic that groups used without professionalising the group. It is not necessarily desirable to

increase the resources of small citizen interest groups or professionalise them, and in any case this would be hard to achieve in research and in real life. We wanted to see if it was possible to professionalise and increase the effectiveness of the lobbying by shoestring (low resource) groups without the groups losing some of their best selling points in terms of their lobbies, such as their closeness to their membership and for some, their lack of co-option into institutions.

Our next question was to define what an effective letter writing campaign would look like. There are argued to be several factors which (may) contribute to an effective lobby of this sort. These are that it comes from a credible source; frames the issue in a way that is consistent with lobbyists' values and goals; offers the policy maker private or 'costly' information that would otherwise be difficult for the policy maker to gather; summarises and processes a mass of publicly available information in a way clarifies the implications for the policy maker; contains emotive or symbolic appeals to commonly held values; outlines how current policy approaches lead to negative outcomes, and how an alternative approach would promote shared policy goals; and has a clear set of recommendations or 'ask'. These are shown in summary in Figure 1.

FIG 1 about HERE

The existing empirical evidence is large and often contradictory (Hall and Deardorff, 2006); however, these factors may or may not be able to be used in a complementary way. For example, it is not clear whether provision of costly information, or emotive appeals are most effective, and under which circumstances, but these two approaches are doing very different things:

“symbolic or valence appeals [that] are unlikely to convey information that is difficult for policymakers to acquire for themselves.” (Baumgartner et al., 2009: p174). We have assumed these factors are additive, and that the use of more of them creates greater effectiveness rather than some things cancelling others out. We now look at each of these factors in more detail.

Lobbying must be from a credible source if the likelihood of policy makers responding is to be increased. For example, James Druckman (2001) found that the credibility of the source of information has a significant impact on the chances for the successful framing of an issue. Gerber and Lupia’s studies (1992) have discovered that the campaign process can provide information if the groups are credible and the campaign can thereby increase the informational efficiency of the electoral outcome. The voluntary and community groups in the study tend not to have some of the more obvious organisational bases for credibility, including simple things like having an office address, staff, and a website. Smaller organisations tend not to have written documentation, such as annual reports and accounts or even publicity leaflets that could offer a sense of security to decision makers that they are dealing with a legitimate organisation. There is a widespread concern about the degree to which community volunteers are representative, but no common understanding of what being representative might mean in practice. The legitimacy and standing of community groups in the local community is an extremely controversial issue in nearly all areas in the UK, particularly when they are arguing with other agencies for change to the status quo views (Taylor, 2005). Community groups have sometimes ambivalent relationships with their neighbours. The majority of the wider population are in a passive position in relation to groups’ work, neither actively involved nor users

(Richardson, 2008). Neighbourhood-based community groups have been reproached because they are seen as not to be trusted to represent the diversity of local populations (Morrison, 2003). Unless groups are registered charities (and therefore subject to some light-touch regulation by the Charities Commission), they are not subject to any form of external regulation which may offer a source of credibility. Therefore the groups in the study face an uphill struggle to demonstrate their credibility, and our experimental intervention also needed to deal with this challenge.

Some see much of the lobbying that goes on as an exercise in framing or issue definition (e.g., Baumgartner et al., 2002). Attempts to reframe the issue are attempts to change the nature of the argument, and frame the issue in a way that is consistent with lobbyists' values and goals. Several of the groups in the study wanted to undertake a campaign to re-shape a local debate already on the agenda to better serve their own needs and the needs of their members, for example to take account of 'missing' client groups in strategies to support vulnerable groups.

There is a long established interest in informational lobbying, from Milbraith (1963) onwards. In terms of effectiveness, Gerber and Lupia's work (1992) provides evidence that information can have powerful effects on behaviour, in this case voters were able to use interest group statements as cues about the impact of proposed policy changes, which effected voting patterns. There are two key aspects to informational lobbying: the provision of costly or private information; and the lobbyist making sense of public information. Offering policy makers private or costly information that would otherwise be difficult for the policy maker to gather reduces costs for the policy-maker. An influential branch of the literature approaches lobbying as the strategic transmission of

asymmetrically held information (e.g. see Potters and van Winden, 1992). Decision makers value information that would otherwise not be accessible (e.g. see Hall and Deardorff, 2006). The model of Potters and van Winden (1992) has a prominent standing in the formal literature on lobbying. In this model, informational lobbying - the use by interest groups of their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies - is often regarded as an important means of influence. For local politicians, the decision makers in our study, their interest in re-election means that they are likely to be more responsive to information that could help in that, including information from citizen interest groups about what constituents' views and issues are (Mahoney, 2007).

When we look at public information, the hypothesis is that successful lobbying will summarise and process a mass of publicly available information in a way clarifies the implications for the policy maker. Hall and Deardorff (2006: p. 74) focus on the transmission of "information that legislators require for their work in influencing legislation," including policy analyses, research reports, and other expertly developed information as well as "political intelligence" (p. 74) that is designed to assist policymakers. The (disputed) argument is that legislators could reduce their level of uncertainty about policy choices by "adding lobbyists' signals to the multitude of cues" (Hall and Deardorff, 2006: p. 71) they already have, as well as the "expansive testimony, policy analyses, reports, publications, and other detailed materials" (p. 71) that lobbyists provide. However, some feel that the more complete information for policy makers is not as valuable as the time to problem solve and "the capacity to use information. Cheap talk will not do" (Hall and Deardorff, 2006: p. 72).

In contrast to evidence about the impact of informational lobbying, there is also a line of argument that emotive or symbolic appeals can be effective, following ideas about the use of emotional intelligence in policy making. For example, one writer shows that although policy makers publicly express a preference for hard facts, in practice it is the symbolic material rather than statistics that they retain, such as stories of individual cases structured to articulate a particular set of commonly held social values (Westen, 2007). As stated above, we have assumed that emotive appeals are playing a different, but not mutually exclusive, function to the offer of information and so we use both in our intervention.

The different forms of argumentation used are an area where a research gap has been identified (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998). “An argument is a statement that links a policy goal with either a justification for the policy or a discussion of its implications” (Baumgartner et al., 2009: p. 388). Empirical work indicates that the two most frequently used forms of argument refer to a) problems with implementation or feasibility, for example outlining how current policy approaches lead to negative outcomes and b) how a policy promotes or inhibits a policy goal, and how an alternative approach would promote shared policy goals. Although frequency is not a reliable guide to effectiveness, we have also included these forms of argument in our study. Some have argued that these arguments are more attractive to unelected civil servants than politicians, but this case could be further tested.

Finally, the literature tells us that effectiveness of lobbying is partly dependent on the quality and clarity of lobbying request (‘the ask’). This means that lobbyists need a clear set of recommendations, including alternative policy

proposals to be successful. There is some evidence to suggest that defenders of the status quo have an advantage as they need to undermine the oppositions' proposals without justifying the status quo position. Whereas, challengers of the status quo need to work harder by outlining a viable alternative policy, and explain how this would work (Baumgartner et al., 2009). As we have described, the groups in the study were all status quo challengers. Feedback from umbrella groups we contacted to develop the study suggested that one of the identified problems that citizen interest groups had was an unclear or weak ask in their lobbying. A raft of 'resources' and support programmes for community groups to become more effective campaigners are being funded in the UK because of this gap. Clarifying the ask the groups were making was therefore a key challenge for the study.

Lobbyists have a tendency to lobby people who are already supporters of their cause, and avoid their opponents (Hall and Deardorff, 2006). This is seen as apparently irrational behaviour and we wanted to overcome this irrational bias; randomisation of the local politicians who receive a particular intervention therefore helps to channel groups' energies in a more even spread across allies, enemies and undecideds.

Methods and Data

The study is a cluster randomised controlled trial, which will aggregate the results of trials carried out within local authorities. The intervention is a letter writing campaigns carried out by citizen interest groups to local elected members in English local authorities. The two treatments are differently worded letters that are sent by a lobby group to the councillors, which are generated from a random

sample of half of all councillors in an authority, then randomised into two treatment groups. To create the lobby we are recruiting local community and voluntary sector partners in each authority to deliver the intervention, aiming for a sample size of around 400-500, i.e. around 16 local community groups or associations each in a different authority. This sample size has been calculated from power calculations that find 484 would be needed to show a difference of ten per cent between the groups with a power of 60 per cent at .05 significance. We estimated the numbers at power of 80 per cent but this created a number of 774 respondents beyond our budget. However, this calculation does not take into account the clustering of the data which depends on assumptions about the inter-cluster correlation (ICC) score, where even modest correlations can have a large impact of the effect size it is possible to show would be significance keeping the numbers constant. Using the helpful University of Aberdeen Health Services Research Unity sample size calculator,⁴ we made some estimates of the increase in sample size needed when the intra-correlation coefficient (ICC) is assumed to be .01. This means an increase in sample size of six clusters, which totals a further 144 councillors, which is tolerable given budget constraints. There is a danger that a much larger ICC would mean that we would not have the budget to observe a ten per cent difference. The formula and the worked examples on the Aberdeen site show how modest increases in the ICC would lead massive increases in sample size needed.

To date, ten groups have been recruited. The local associations are unique to each locality, but similar in terms of their grassroots connections. Interest groups involved in the experiment include faith organisations, refugee/new

⁴. See http://aberdeen.ac.uk/hsru/research/del_of_care/professionals_behaviour/cluster/

migrant organisations, organisations working with black and ethnic minority groups, participatory arts organisations, disability/carers' networks and youth groups.

The letters outline a real local issue of concern for the groups, and are adapted to that local issue, but follow a standard and consistent structure. There are two treatment groups receiving letters from the same local group. The research randomly allocates half of all the local politicians into the two treatment groups so the only difference between the groups is the quality and level of professionalism of the letter they receive from a local association working with the researchers.⁵ The structure for both treatments is shown in Figures 2 and 3, which show the treatments and how they link to the literature as summarised in Figure 1. Treatment 1 contains weak, un-evidenced and not locally relevant versions of five of the eight factors in effective lobbying. It does not contain three of the eight factors (PRIVATE INFO, VALUES, ALT POLICY). It has only one reference to a weak and unclear ask. Treatment 2 contains strong, evidenced and locally relevant versions of all the factors in effective lobbying. There are three references to a clear ask, and two references to all other factors, apart from how current policy is failing or leads to negative outcomes which has one reference.

FIGS 2 and 3 about HERE

When the fieldwork is complete, the analysis will compare mean letter responses according in the two groups to see whether a more professionalised approach yields a higher response. Subsequent regression analysis seeks to

⁵. We are greatly to Stephen Greasley from IPEG who performed the randomisation for using SPSS.

predict responsiveness according to age, executive status, gender, other observable characteristics of the politicians, as well as characteristics of the group including size and funding source, with the standard errors clustered on the council.

So far only one group has completed their intervention. This church-based organisation supports newly arrived migrants, asylum seekers and refugees with English, housing, employment and education, and other forms of integration including civic activity like volunteering. The group felt that current council policy did not offer enough provision to assist people into employment once they had gained a right to remain in the UK, and wanted to pitch a proposal for an employment project. They first sent a hard copy letter, personally addressed, to a total of 32 local politicians (i.e. 16 in each treatment group). After four weeks, they had received no response. They then sent the two treatments by email, again individually and personally addressed. Within days they then received four responses from the 32 decision makers, but no more responses after that. Three replies were in response to Treatment 1 (the 'less effective' letter), and one was in reply to Treatment 2 (the 'more effective' letter).

Treatment 2, the more professionalised letter, generated a single line email response: "*I would be more than happy to help in any way I can*", where it is difficult to discern whether this is a 'form' reply or genuinely meant.

Treatment 1 generated the following three replies:

- One detailed email which criticised the letter's lack of acknowledgement of the authorities work on the issue, denied the extent of the problem, and blamed an opposition political party for the current policy gaps

- One phone call with an offer of support and a face to face meeting to discuss the group's proposals in more detail
- One email which clarified the person was not the key policy maker for his political party, offered to forward the message to the appropriate person, and also commented on the importance of the problem of supporting refugees and newly arrived migrants into paid employment: *“You can imagine the public reaction to local Council Tax being used for this purpose. Use your good intentions to lobby [a national politician] to ensure there is no cost to the local purse in the very near future (Look into Zimbabwe). The political implications and the public backlash when (not if) this happens are obvious.”*

Is the case that the less professionalised approached yields a higher response? It is too early to say but the pilot seems to show this.

Discussion and Conclusion

Clearly very few inferences can be made at this stage. However, the low level of response is notable. Indeed, several groups approached to take part in the study refused on the grounds that lobbying politicians was a pointless activity as they were unlikely to respond. However, before we can draw these rather dire conclusions, there are several other avenues worth exploring if the same pattern holds (with the 'bad' letter doing better than the 'good' letter).

One avenue is that some factors of an effective letter for English local councillors may be peculiar to that group and context. Treatment 1 varies from the Treatment 2 in the ways specified but broadly that it missing the elements

considered in the literature to make up an effective lobby. However, it is also positively adapted for a specifically English local government context. In this context, it may be the case that offers of private and public information may be off-putting to local decision makers as they downgrade the expert status of the local politician. The second treatment has more emphasis on strategic context, something which is more and more prevalent in UK local governments' discussions of the community leadership role, but which does not feature in the literature. It steers away from emotive appeals to common values as potentially polarising to a politically divided audience. We eagerly await the remainder of the data to test these ideas further.

Figure 1: Summary of the literature on effective lobbying

- comes from a credible source - CREDIBLE
- frames the issue in a way that is consistent with lobbyists' values and goals - FRAMING
- offers the policy maker private or 'costly' information that would otherwise be difficult for the policy maker to gather – PRIVATE INFO
- summarises and processes a mass of publicly available information in a way clarifies the implications for the policy maker – PUBLIC INFO
- contains emotive or symbolic appeals to commonly held values - VALUES
- outlines how current policy approaches lead to negative outcomes – BAD POLICY
- outlines how an alternative approach would promote shared policy goals – ALT POLICY
- has a clear set of recommendations or 'ask' – ASK

Figure 2: structure of Treatment 1 in relation to the literature

Treatment 1 - Letter structure	Link to literature
Brief description of group/organisation. Why writing.	No proof or facts on how CREDIBLE Weak ASK
Brief overview of strategic priorities.	PUBLIC INFO
Description of groups work	Weak version of why CREDIBLE, not including facts or evidence
Wider impacts for society and/or the local area of the issue, and/or people's attitudes in the UK.	BAD POLICY without proof/facts, not locally relevant
Statements about the value of voluntary/community groups roles in relation to the issue, not referenced.	FRAMING without specific reference to group
Generic ask ie outcome measure.	n/a – measurement
<p>Summary Contains weak, un-evidenced and not locally relevant versions of five of the eight factors in effective lobbying. Does not contain three of the eight factors (PRIVATE INFO, VALUES, ALT POLICY) One reference to a weak and unclear ask.</p>	

Figure 3: structure of Treatment 2 in relation to the literature

Treatment 2 - Letter structure	Link to literature
Brief sentence - why writing, including goals that will benefit the authority and area;	ALT POLICY with goals Clear ASK
Acknowledgement of work the local authority has already done, but brief overview of need for further work. Need for all parties to play a role.	BAD POLICY with proof/facts, locally relevant FRAMING PUBLIC INFO
Statement that group has ideas/proposals and aims/possible policy outcomes of proposals. Overall benefits to communities	ALT POLICY with goals Clear ASK
Acknowledgement of any existing activity by politicians and statements about need to work together.	Clear ASK
What role the group wants to play in future, how they can contribute, or what skills they can offer.	PRIVATE INFO FRAMING in relation to group specifically
Boxed example of groups' work highlighting their capacity, membership or skills and track record, and issues for members.	PRIVATE INFO Facts supporting why CREDIBLE VALUES
Summary of strategic and policy links in local area. Summary of societal impacts and research showing benefits of work, including references.	PUBLIC INFO with locally relevant evidence VALUES with evidence
Description of org highlighting its strengths, membership numbers etc.	Strong statement of how CREDIBLE
Generic ask i.e. outcome measure.	n/a – measurement
<p>Summary Contains strong, evidenced and locally relevant versions of all the factors in effective lobbying. There are three references to a clear ask, and two references to all other factors (apart from how current policy is failing or leads to negative outcomes).</p>	

References

- Austen-Smith, D. and Wright, J. (1992) 'Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator's Vote', *Social Choice and Welfare* 9, p229–57.
- Baumgartner, F. and Leech, B. (1998) *Basic Interests* New Jersey: Princeton University Press
- Baumgartner, F., Berry, J., Hojnacki, M., Leech, B. and Kimball, D. (2002) "Organized Interests and Issue Definition in Policy Debates." in Cigler, A. and Loomis, B (eds) *Interest Group Politics*, 6th Edition,.. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Baumgartner, F., Berry, J., Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D., and Leech B. (2009 forthcoming), *Advocacy and Policy Change*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Berry, J. (1977) *Lobbying for the People: The Political Behaviour of Public Interest Groups* Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Druckman, J. (2001) "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?", *Journal of Politics* 63 p1042–1044.
- Gerber, E. and Lupia, A. (1992) *Competitive campaigns and the responsiveness of collective choice*, Working Papers 813 California: California Institute of Technology
- Grant, W. (2000) *Pressure Groups and British Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Grant, W. (2004) 'Pressure Politics: the changing world of pressure groups', *Parliamentary Affairs* 57: 2 p408-419
- Green, D. and Gerber, A. (2008) *Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout* Washington: Brookings Institute
- Hall, R. and Deardorff, A. (2006) 'Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy', *American Political Science Review* 100:1 p69-84

- Lohmann, S. (1995) 'Information, Access and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying', *Public Choice* 85:3-4 p267-284.
- Lukes S. (2005) *Power: A Radical View*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Mahoney, C. (2007) 'Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union', *Journal of Public Policy* 27:1 p35-56
- Milbraith, L.M. (1963) *The Washington Lobbyists*, Chicago: Rand-McNally
- Morrison, Z. (2003) 'Cultural justice and addressing "social exclusion": a case study of a single regeneration budget project in Blackbird Leys', in Imrie, R. and Raco, M. (eds) *Urban renaissance? New Labour, community and urban policy*, Bristol: Policy Press
- Potters, J., and van Winden, F., (1992) 'Lobbying and asymmetric information' *Public Choice* 74 p:269–292.
- Richardson, L. (2008) *DIY Community Action: neighbourhood problems and community self-help*, Bristol: Policy Press
- Taylor, M. (2005) *Willing partners? Voluntary and community associations in the democratic process*, Swindon: ESRC.
- Watson, R. and Shackleton, M. (2003) 'Organized interests and lobbying in the EU' in Bomberg, E. and Stubb, A. (eds) *The European Union: How Does it Work?*, Oxford University Press: Oxford
- Westen, D. (2007) *The Political Brain: the role of emotion in deciding the fate of the nation*, PublicAffairs: Canada